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The strategic logistics decisions of a company are vulnerable to current legislation aimed at 
widespread collection of state sales taxes for e-commerce orders in their pursuit to provide 
excellent performance and create a competitive advantage for the company. Jeff Bezos, the founder 
of Amazon, based Amazon in Seattle partly to maximize the tax advantage (Elkind and Burke, 
2013) with the focus on physical location as key to the success of an internet-based business.  We 
examine two hypotheses to address the question that etailers (like Amazon) consider, when 
opening up distribution centers: whether they should operate under the assumption that they will 
bear the burden of sales and use tax compliance for internet sales and thus not account for this in 
supply chain decisions or whether they should continue to strategically modify their supply chains 


































ANALYZING INTERNET SALES AND USE TAX INFLUENCES ON AMAZON’S 
STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS 
 
 
Introduction   
 
As online shopping became a normal mode of commerce, traditional brick-and-mortar 
stores found themselves at a competitive disadvantage with major e-tailers (e.g. Amazon.com) that 
operated almost exclusively online.  This competitive disadvantage stemmed not only from the 
additional costs of maintaining a physical presence, but also from issues of taxation, particularly 
collection and remittance of sales and, in some instances, use taxes on goods purchased on the 
internet by consumers.  Recognition of this problem by state legislatures and state tax authorities 
prompted a surge of interest in finding ways to capture this ever-growing, yet elusive revenue 
stream.   
In 2008, the New York legislature initiated what has become a state legislature and special 
interest tug-of-war over online sales tax revenues.  New York became one of the first states to 
enact a tax law specifically designed to capture this lost revenue on internet purchases by 
mandating collection of sales taxes by the e-tailer, namely targeting Amazon.com.1  The rules set 
forth by the legislature in New York’s new internet sales tax law, later referred to as the “Amazon 
Tax”, caused a great deal of controversy.  Balancing U.S. Constitutional and other federal legal 
obligations with online sales tax collection or use tax reporting efforts proved tricky for state 
lawmakers.  The chances for tremendous revenue gains appeared to be slipping away until the 
arrival of a ruling by the New York Court of Appeals upholding the law and a subsequent U.S. 
Supreme Court’s denial to review that holding.  Thus, ‘Amazon Tax’ laws proliferated throughout 
the country, taking on slight variations for each state.  Unwilling to yield, Amazon fought back 
through strategic use of market power and their supply chain distribution systems.  Analysis of 
Amazon’s supply chain data shows Amazon’s tax-advantaged supply chain strategy proved very 
effective for Amazon in minimizing the tax impact of the Amazon tax laws.   
  While several commentators discussed the constitutional issues surrounding the various 
forms of the ‘Amazon Tax’ in relation to the online tax debate,2 this article focuses on both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of Amazon’s nimble and strategic responses to variations on 
the ‘Amazon Tax’ implemented in numerous states and the overall movement towards legislatively 
mandated internet state sales tax collections or use tax reporting culminating with the Wayfair 
decision of June 2018.3.  By linking analysis of Amazon’s strategic supply and distribution chain 
decisions to law and policy implementation for internet sales and use taxation, it is shown that 
Amazon’s strategic tax game ultimately made them an overall victor in the online tax war in 
exchange for some delivery efficiency.  However, other online merchants, including Amazon’s 
affiliates, may have been Amazon’s fodder to achieve their supply chain victory.  Now orphaned 
                                                          
1 N.Y. State Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi); See Overstock.com, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 20 N.Y. 
3d 586, 590, 987 N.E.2d 621, 622 (2013). 
2 See Sherry Tehrani, Welcome to the Amazon: Leading Online Retail From Local Tax Avoidance Into Your 
Backyard, 67 TAX LAW. 875 (2014); see also Adam B. Thimmesch, The Tax Hangover: Trailing Nexus, 33 VA. TAX 
REV. 497 (2014); see also Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State 
Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 371 (2017). 
3 See WILLIAM HOFFMAN et. al., SOUTH-WESTERN FEDERAL TAXATION 2017: COMPREHENSIVE, PROFESSIONAL 
EDITION 1-9 (40TH ed. 2016). 
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by their most powerful ally, merchants in several battleground states must decide whether to 
surrender via participation in an online tax amnesty or face potentially costly consequences of 
continuing to fight against an increasingly organized force of state tax agencies and the recent 
Wayfair decision supporting state tax authority efforts.4 
 
I. Testing Hypotheses for Amazon’s United States Distribution Center Location Strategy 
 
The strategic logistics decisions of e-tailers, such as Amazon.com, Inc., in their pursuit to 
provide excellent performance and create a competitive advantage for the company, are vulnerable 
to legislation aimed at mandatory collection and/or reporting of state sales and use taxes for e-
commerce orders. Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon, based the company in Seattle partly to 
maximize the tax advantage.5  More specifically, and to highlight Bezos’ strategic thinking, Bezos 
stated "physical location is very important for the success of a virtual business.”6  In both a 
domestic and international business operations context, tax legislation and tax policies can play a 
significant role in a business’ strategic decision-making.  The purpose of this article is to 
empirically evaluate the relationship between internet sales and use tax legislation and the strategic 
supply chain decisions of one of the largest e-tailers, Amazon.com, Inc. to see if the data shows 
inefficient alterations in Amazon.com, Inc.’s supply chain system aligning with the passage of 
internet sales and use tax legislation targeting aspects of Amazon’s business operations.  The 
strategic locational decisions of Amazon’s distribution centers are vital to Amazon’s profitability, 
affected by their ability to capture the market and offer high service levels (as of 2018 Amazon 
offers same-day delivery to over 8,000 cities and towns for prime members7), and by the associated 
costs of providing such services (the amortized investments in new distribution centers (“DCs”), 
local fulfillment costs, taxes, and transportation costs).8 
We examine two hypotheses to address strategic decisions that etailers, like Amazon.com, 
Inc., consider when opening up distribution centers in light of the changing internet sales and use 
tax law landscape: 1) whether to operate under the assumption that collecting and/or reporting 
online sales and use tax is inevitable in spite of conflicting nexus considerations and thus to not 
consider tax implications when deciding where to locate DC’s and adopt the most efficient supply 
chain design characterized by lowest lead times and transit costs or 2) whether to strategically 
position their supply chain in a tax advantageous way at the potential expense of logistical 
                                                          
4 This includes the District of Columbia and 23 States: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  Multistate Tax Commission, Online 
Marketplace Seller Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, Aug. 17, 2017 available at 
http://www.mtc.gov/getattachment/Nexus-Program/Online-Marketplace-Seller-Initiative/Online-Marketplace-
Seller-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-rev12.pdf.aspx (hereinafter “Tax Amnesty”). 
5 Peter Elkind and Doris Burke, Amazon’s (not so secret) War on Taxes, FORTUNE (May 23, 2013), 
http://fortune.com/2013/05/23/amazons-not-so-secret-war-on-taxes/. 
6 Michael Mazerov, Proposed “Business Activity Tax Nexus” Legislation Would Seriously Undermine State Taxes 
on Corporate Profits And Harm the Economy, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, Feb. 26, 2014, at 13 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-24-08sfp.pdf. 
7 Amazon.com, Inc., August 14, 2018, https://www.amazon.com/Prime-FREE-Same-Day-
Delivery/b?ie=UTF8&node=8729023011 




efficiency by cutting internet sales and use tax ‘sweetheart’ deals and/or strategically fighting such 
legislation in major supply chain hubs.   These questions are particularly important due to the 
aforementioned profitability and distribution infrastructure investment decisions.  More 
specifically and thoroughly, the approach of each hypothesis is expanded and outlined as: 
 
Hypothesis (1): Amazon’s strategic location decisions for expanding physical operations 
into more States did not alter to deter the tax burden costs and Amazon’s strategic location 
decisions focus on enabling faster service, including same-day delivery, of goods while 
supporting convenience and a diverse selection to maintain a critical part of Amazon's 
appeal. Distribution center decisions, specifically the number of distribution centers and 
their location in the supply chain network, affect the competitive distribution center costs 
and optimum customer response.   
 
For example, in 2003 many Amazon products purchased by Miami, FL consumers come from a 
warehouse 1000 miles away in Memphis, TN, making the logistics difficult for "next-day" or "two-
day" deliveries.   Amazon expanded into states that legislated mandatory collection of internet 
sales tax and/or reporting for use tax purposes, such as California in 2012, finding that sales still 
increased even though the total cost (product price plus sales tax) increased for the consumer.   The 
strategic value of select locations, providing lower shipping costs and shorter delivery times, in 
Amazon’s overall supply chain may have proven too high to consider abandonment or significant 
supply chain alteration as a response to internet sales and use tax legislation. Tompkins 
International reported that the strategic DC location decision to service customers has evolved 
from just considering factors such as transportation costs and taxes, to the level of service that can 
be provided in an area.   Amazon is investing to provide faster service to its customers by building 
DCs near major metropolitan areas.   This hypothesis aligns with the public statements made by 
Jeff Bezos regarding Amazon’s strategic supply chain focus, which aligns with our qualitative and 
quantitative data assessment used to verify actual supply chain efficiency outcomes with 
Amazon’s stated strategy. 
 
 
Hypothesis (2): Amazon’s strategic location decisions for expanding physical operations 
into more States altered to deter the tax burden costs, at the expense of supply chain 
efficiency, and in contravention to the public statements made by Jeff Bezos about primary 
focus on delivery efficiency.  
 
Not incurring sales and use tax obligations and competing on low prices provides Amazon with a 
10% advantage where profit margins are already thin.9  As States pass legislation requiring 
Amazon to collect sales tax or prepare use tax reports, strategic supply chain decisions may skew 
towards inefficient distribution systems when side deals on the state and local online tax issues 
cannot be arranged. As of August 2017, items sold by Amazon.com, Inc., or its subsidiaries, and 
shipped to destinations in thirty-eight States are subject to tax.10  To alleviate this burden, Amazon 
                                                          
9 Robert W. Wood, Amazon No Longer Tax-Free: 10 Surprising Facts As Giant Loses Ground, FORBES (Aug. 22, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/08/22/amazon-no-longer-tax-free-10-surprising-facts-as-
giant-loses-ground/. 
10 Amazon.com, Inc., About Sales Tax, AMAZON.COM (January 5, 2016),    
5 
 
made agreements with select States that require collection by Amazon of e-commerce sales tax or 
require use tax reporting by the etailer, to build warehouses in exchange for delayed 
implementation of compliance obligations (in New Jersey, for instance, Amazon promised to build 
two distribution centers, hiring more than 1,500 full-time employees and thousands of temporary 
and construction workers in the State, in exchange for not collecting sales tax until July 2013).11  
Aside from distribution centers, other investments by Amazon, such as customer service centers, 
were included in some deals with States; however, our data analysis focuses specifically on the 
deals involving new distribution center locations emerging from the deals between Amazon and 
the respective States. 
 
 To examine the hypotheses, we surveyed the landscape of the internet sales tax legislation 
that will impact Amazon’s strategic decision-making process.  Then, by collecting logistical data 
(i.e. the locations of Amazon’s distribution centers that are opened up over time, closed over time, 
and the states that have enacted sales tax legislation) we compare these strategic location choices 
to the optimal choice that would enable optimal (fastest) speed of delivery of products to 
consumers to quantify if the actual impact of Amazon’s strategic locational choices are based on 
speed of delivery or cost minimization (deter the tax burden). 
 
  As our data indicates, location of Amazon’s distribution centers plays an important role in 
the on-going state and local tax litigation for Amazon’s online marketing affiliates (called 
“Amazon Associates”)12 and third-party sellers who utilize Amazon’s extensive distribution 
network through the “Fulfilled by Amazon” shipping option (“Amazon’s FBA”) for their 
businesses.13  As will be discussed below, Amazon used these third-party sellers and affiliates as 
a tool to extract tax concessions from several State tax authorities.  Upon reaching a competitive 
tax advantage through their supply chain strategy, Amazon stopped opposing many of the State 
tax authorities’ efforts to more expansively define nexus (excluding the new “online marketplace” 
laws of South Carolina and Minnesota),14 effectively abandoning the fight on behalf of the very 
same third-party sellers they used to gain their tax-advantaged supply chain.  Third-party sellers 
that previously utilized Amazon’s FBA services have been offered internet sales tax amnesties; 
however, one of the larger amnesties, from 2017, is based on a commitment by online sellers to 
future compliance with each of the 24 participating States’ separate interpretations of what 
                                                          
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468512 (Alaska is a  special case whereby only 
items sold as Amazon Warehouse Deals and shipped to Alaska are taxed locally). 
11 Id. 
12 Amazon.com, Associate Program Policies,  
https://affiliate-program.amazon.com/help/operating/policies#Associates Program Fee Statement. 
13 Amazon.com, Amazon Services, Fulfillment by Amazon, How it Works, 
https://services.amazon.com/fulfillment-by-amazon/how-it-works.htm/ref=asus_fba_snav_how. 
14 Amazon stopped fighting the nexus legal battles in situations where Amazon is not being held responsible for 
collecting sales tax on behalf of the third-party sellers via online marketplace laws that recently cropped in South 
Carolina and Minnesota; they will still fight if a State tax authority claims they are responsible for collecting sales 
taxes on behalf of their third party sellers; see Eugene Kim, Amazon Faces a Tax Fight in South Carolina That 





constitutes nexus for sales and use tax collection and reporting.15  Contemporaneously, tax 
authorities in South Carolina are suing Amazon, claiming that Amazon ultimately bears the 
responsibility for collecting online sales taxes on behalf of its third party sellers because of South 
Carolina’s new “online marketplace” law.16  In order to fully comprehend how Amazon’s supply 
chain decisions led to the tax amnesty, the evolving legal history of the state and local online tax 
jurisprudence is discussed next. 
 
II. Internet Sales and Use Tax Law  
 
  The substantive forms of the Amazon tax evolved quite a lot over the years due to variations 
in state legislation.  One of the interesting issues associated with the launch and subsequent 
litigation over these variants of the Amazon tax is the inclusion of marketers in addition to online 
sellers through the emergence of click-thru nexus arguments by state tax authorities.17  The 
reasoning for this can be seen in the historical emergence and re-shaping of nexus for state and 
local taxation, but this inclusion of marketers also presents a point of significant contention in the 
on-going legal debate.  As of late 2017, pre-Wayfair, Amazon collected sales tax in the majority 
of states for items shipped and sold by Amazon.com or subsidiaries.  However, Amazon refused 
to bend to the broadest of the new nexus “online marketplace” laws, as seen by the lawsuit with 
the South Carolina tax authorities in June 2017.  A year later, the Wayfair decision addressed some 
of the big questions, but not all of the concerns associated with internet taxation. 
 
A.  Background 
 
Prior to 2008 (when the New York “Amazon” internet sales tax became law), consumers 
across the United States were able to purchase goods without sales tax being collected at time of 
purchase from online merchants so long as those online merchants lacked a physical presence in 
the state where the consumer lived.18  This concept of physical presence or ‘nexus’ as later applied 
in future cases involving attempts to force sales tax collection by out-of-state retailers, evolved 
from a late 1960s United States Supreme Court case involving attempts by various States to tax 
purchases from mail-order catalogs.19  The key issues in this line of cases often involved violations 
of the Commerce Clause, and to a certain extent, the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.   
Amazon’s tax problems arising from these various internet sales and use tax laws impacted 
their supply chain and, consequently, their affiliate program decisions.20  Since this article 
empirically explores Amazon’s distribution system in relation to the sales and use tax laws, the 
relationship of Amazon’s marketing affiliate/associate programs to those very same laws is 
embedded in the analysis.  This is due to the interwoven nature of Amazon’s supply chain decisions 
                                                          
15 Tax Amnesty, supra note 4. 
16 Tony Owusu, Amazon’s Tax Fight in South Carolina Could Set a Huge Precedent, THE STREET (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/14272621/1/amazon-s-tax-fight-in-south-carolina-could-set-precedent-for-online-
retailers.html. 
17 See infra section II. C. 
18 N.Y. State Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi). 
19 National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
20 See Associates Program Policies, supra note 18. 
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and States’ internet sales and use tax laws that either directly or indirectly targeted those marketing 
affiliate/associate programs. 
Following the passage of the New York Amazon law, the passage of additional variants of 
‘New York Style Amazon Laws’ in multiple states prompted decisional conflict among the various 
courts charged with hearing the matters.  However, some of these courts chose to approach the 
clones of New York’s Amazon law from a different angle to either validate it (such as occurred in 
Colorado) or to invalidate it (such as occurred in Illinois).  This left it up to Amazon.com, Inc. and 
other such companies to attempt to negotiate internet sales and use incentive tax deals with states 
on a state-by-state bilateral basis in an effort to maintain respective competitive advantages (i.e. 
Amazon’s supply chain efficiency) while fighting contentious battles in the courts. 
 
B.  Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, and First Amendment Issues 
 
  National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois (“Bellas”) is the closest 
legal relative to where courts and policymakers find themselves today in attempting to reconcile 
Constitutional obligations with the need to collect tax revenue.21  The Bellas case involved a mail 
order company with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri that was required by 
the Illinois Department of Revenue through an Illinois Supreme Court order to collect and pay use 
taxes to Illinois despite Bellas lacking outlets, warehouses or sales representatives in Illinois.22  
Bellas’ contacts with the State of Illinois were limited to the postal system or common carrier for 
delivery of goods purchased by customers from its mail order catalog.23  To a certain extent, Bellas 
effectively was the e-tailer equivalent for its time period.  The government of Illinois asserted that 
this solicitation of customers who lived in Illinois via mail order catalog by Bellas was the 
equivalent of maintaining a place of business in the state under the 1965 Illinois Revenue Statute 
Chapter 120 Section 439.2.24  The United States Supreme Court sided with Bellas’ claim that the 
Illinois tax collection obligation created an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, 
specifically stating:  
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in 
character than the mail order transactions here involved. And if the power of Illinois to 
impose use tax burdens upon National [Bellas] were upheld, the resulting impediments 
upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote.25   
The next major evolution in the Bellas lineage of cases emerged from the decision of a 1977 
Supreme Court case, Complete Auto Transit v. Brady (“Auto Transit”), involving sales tax on the 
delivery services of General Motors vehicles manufactured outside of the state charging the tax.26  
The Auto Transit case clarified the validity of a non-discriminatory state tax imposed on a business 
with a substantial nexus to the tax imposing state.27 
                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 754. 
23 Id. at 754-55. 
24 Id. at 755. 
25 Id. at 759. 
26 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
27 Id. at 278-80. 
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 Twenty-five years following the Bellas decision, in Quill Corp. V. Heitkamp (“Quill”), the 
Supreme Court found itself facing another mail order catalog case. 28  Quill involved the imposition 
of a use tax collection obligation on an out-of-state company, Quill Corporation, for goods it sold 
that would be used within the state of North Dakota.  The Supreme Court in Quill made an 
important distinction and clarification between the ‘minimum contacts’ requirements of the Due 
Process Clause and the ‘substantial nexus’ requirement of the Commerce Clause.  More 
specifically, the Supreme Court stated that the Due Process requirement was to provide “notice or 
fair warning”, while the Commerce Clause’s nexus requirement emerged from “concerns about 
the effects of state regulation on the national economy.”29  Additionally, it was made clear that 
although a company, such as the Quill Corporation, may have minimum contacts to meet Due 
Process Clause requirements it could still lack substantial nexus and thus disallow for the validity 
of the use tax measures in question.30 
This distinction and differentiation by the court between Due Process Clause requirements 
and Commerce Clause requirements refuted the State of North Dakota’s claim that the nexus 
requirements imposed by both clauses were the same.31  In reaching its decision, the Supreme 
Court highlighted the four-factor test developed in the Auto Transit case: “we will sustain a tax 
against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the "tax 1. is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, 2. is fairly apportioned, 3. does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and 4. is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”32 Collectively 
with the established earlier jurisprudence stemming from the Bellas case lineage, the Supreme 
Court in Quill presumptively recognized a bright-line physical-presence requirement to create 
substantial nexus for businesses similar to mail-order catalog companies with operations like Quill 
Corporation.   
A subsequent attack on this presumptive bright-line test came from the State of New York, 
when it passed its ‘Amazon law’ which created its own presumption that out-of-state Internet 
retailers (e-tailers) are in-state vendors even without a physical presence in the state.  New York’s 
‘Amazon law’ went through extensive litigation brought by Amazon.com, Inc. and ultimately 
ended with a petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed on August 23, 2013, that was denied on 
December 2, 2013.33  The questions presented in the filed Writ of Certiorari go back to the original 
concerns over tax collection obligations imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause when there 
is no physical presence in New York and a new take on Due Process Clause violation – New 
York’s adoption of an effectively irrefutable presumption that the requirements for taxation under 
the Commerce Clause are satisfied.34   
Other Constitutional problems for Amazon tax collection efforts emerged in the form of 
purchase information demands for tax reporting. In December of 2009, the North Carolina 
Department of Revenue requested from Amazon “‘all information for all sales to customers with 
a North Carolina shipping address by month in an electronic format for all dates between August 
                                                          
28 Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
29 Id. at 309-10. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 311. 
32 Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279. 
33 Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 682 (2013). 
34 Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259). 
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1, 2003, and February 28, 2010.”35  Amazon.com, Inc. and the American Civil Liberties Union 
objected to supplying detailed customer information along with their purchases and filed suit on 
First Amendment grounds.36 District Court Judge Marsha Pechman agreed with Amazon and the 
ACLU stating in her opinion granting summary judgment- “The First Amendment protects a buyer 
from having the expressive content of her purchase of books, music, and audiovisual materials 
disclosed to the government. Citizens are entitled to receive information and ideas through books, 
films, and other expressive materials anonymously.”37  In June 2017, Connecticut took a similar 
approach in efforts to force collection of sales tax on non-physically present online sellers via 
sending demand letters with reporting requirements that potentially violate consumer privacy and 
1st Amendment rights.38   
Despite the invitation towards litigation surrounding the New York ‘Amazon tax’, many 
States hoping for additional sales tax revenues adopted, with mixed success, duplicates or slight 
variations on the ‘Amazon tax’; many States found themselves facing litigation and/or small e-
business lobby political pushback as a result.  However, the most significant strategic outcome of 
the continued push towards internet sales taxation resulted in alterations of Amazon’s investment 
decisions for their supply chain operations in several States.  By targeting Amazon through sales 
and use tax laws, many States were faced with a choice to either litigate or broker a deal to avoid 
losing Amazon’s current or proposed engagements with the State. 
 
C.  Amazon Tax Clone Laws, Affiliate Nexus, and Associated Jurisprudence 
 
Attempts by other State governments to duplicate New York’s ‘Amazon tax’ met with 
mixed success.  Eight states in particular have witnessed their initial (and occasionally successive) 
legislative attempts either fail outright (Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi and Nebraska), get vetoed 
by their governor (Hawaii and Ohio) or face major court challenges (Colorado and Illinois).39  In 
the two states where local courts addressed a variation on the Amazon tax law, Colorado and 
Illinois, there emerged two divergent opinions on the validity of the law, with one court upholding 
it and the other invalidating it.40  In late 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court, in a 6-to-1 decision in 
Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer (“Hamer”), found that the Internet Tax Freedom Act (the 
“ITFA”) preempted Illinois’ state Amazon tax law.41   
The ITFA emerged in 1998 to address concerns regarding restriction on internet access 
through the imposition of potential internet access taxes.42  Initially, the law imposed a three year 
moratorium on the imposition of any internet access taxes.43  Five internet access tax moratorium 
                                                          
35 Amazon.com LLC v. Kenneth R. Lay, 758 F. Supp.2d 1154, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1167. 
38 Stephen Kranz, Diann Smith, Eric Carstens, Sellers Beware Connecticuit’s Demands for Customer Data, LAW 
360 (July 27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/948554/sellers-beware-connecticut-s-demands-for-customer-
data. 
39 See infra notes 35 and 54. 
40 Id. 
41 Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2013). 




extensions later, the ITFA discussion continues.44  The most recent extension, signed into law as 
part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 by President Obama, extended the ITFA 
through October 16, 2016.45  In December of 2015, Senator Dick Durbin (Democrat – Illinois) 
spoke openly in opposition of adopting a permanent ITFA until the House of Representatives votes 
on one of the many variations of the Marketplace Fairness Act.46  Senator Durbin’s statements 
about taking some action on the Marketplace Fairness Act prior to consideration of making 
permanent the ITFA undoubtedly originate from the internet sales and use tax issues addressed by 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Durbin’s home State.  In spite of Senator Dick Durbin’s protests, the 
ITFA was made permanent (referred to as “PITFA”) in February 2016 as part of the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.47 
Although internet access taxes (as opposed to internet sales and use taxes) formed the focus 
behind initial creation of the ITFA, the basis for the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Hamer 
rested on a clause in the ITFA generally prohibiting States from imposing discriminatory taxes on 
electronic commerce.48  Specifically, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the disparity in tax 
treatment between web retailers who sell through links on IL websites (establishing “click-
through-nexus”49) and web retailers who simply advertise through print or broadcast to sell.50  The 
Illinois Amazon tax law obligated retailers to collect sales tax if they established click-through-
nexus (the first scenario mentioned) while allowing the print/broadcast web retailers to escape the 
sales tax collection obligation.51  Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court stated “by singling out retailers 
with Internet performance marketing arrangements for use tax collection [emphasis added], the 
Act imposes discriminatory taxes within the meaning of the ITFA.”52  Unfortunately, for e-tailers 
hit by the 2011 Illinois Amazon tax law, the decision arrived a bit too late as two-thirds of Amazon 
affiliate businesses either went out of business or left the state of Illinois (Performance Marketing 
Association, 2013).53  After the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling on Illinois’ version of an Amazon 
tax law, the Illinois legislature changed their now invalidated tax law and removed specific 
                                                          
44 The ITFA was extended first in 2001, then again in 2004, in 2007 and two more times in 2014; see H.R. 1552, 
107th Cong. (2001) (enacted)[extending the ITFA’s expiration date through Nov. 1, 2003); see also Internet Tax 
Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 108-435, 118 Stat. 2615 (2004) [extending the ITFA’s expiration date through 
Nov. 1, 2007]; see also H.R. 3678, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) [extending the ITFA’s expiration date through 
October 2014]; see also H.R.J. Res. 124, 113th Cong. (2014) [extending the ITFA’s expiration date through Dec. 11, 
2014]; see also H.R. 83, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted) [extending the ITFA’s expiration date through September 
2015]; see also H.R. 719, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted)[extending ITFA’s expiration through December 2015]. 
45 See H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015).  
46 John Eggerton, Durbin Leads ITFA Pushback, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.multichannel.com/news/congress/durbin-leads-itfa-pushback/395978 (For an in-depth discussion on the 
Marketplace Fairness Act see infra Section C on pp. XX). 
47 See infra note 75 and Section D. 
48 Hamer, 998 N.E.2d at 59 ¶ 23, supra note 35. 
49 Id. at 59 ¶¶ 21-23. 
50 Id. at 59 ¶ 22. 
51 Id. at 59 ¶¶ 21-23. 
52 Id. at 59 ¶ 19. 
53 Brian Littleton, Performance Marketing Association Wins Suit Challenging Validity of Illinois Affiliate Nexus 




references to the internet along with including coverage for print and broadcast to address the 
provisions of the earlier law impacted by the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling.54 
In contrast, a few months prior to the Hamer case, the 10th Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
lifted an injunction (imposed earlier in March 2012) prohibiting enforcement of Colorado’s 
Amazon tax law in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl (“Brohl”).55  The 10th Circuit’s reasoning 
behind the decision to lift the injunction involved the Federal Tax Injunction Act’s prohibition on 
federal courts’ right to suspend state tax laws.56  The Tax Injunction Act (the “TIA”) states “[t]he 
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax 
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such 
State.”57 According to the 10th Circuit Court’s interpretation of the TIA, state tax law issues should 
be solved in state courts first prior to a federal court suspending enforcement of such laws through 
an injunction.58  It is significant to note that in reaching the decision, the 10th Circuit also dismissed 
the Commerce Clause claims of the case.59  The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
Direct Marketing Association’s appeal on the question: 
Whether the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to 
enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither 
imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of 
state tax administration?60 
On March 3rd, 2015, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 10th Circuit 
Court’s decision stating that Direct Marketing Association’s suit is not barred by the TIA.61  The 
decision rested on interpretation of the terms “assessment”, “levy”, and “collection” within the 
context of the Federal Tax Code as not inclusive of “informational notices or private reports of 
information relevant to tax liability.”62  This decision may allow other affiliates to adopt the Direct 
Marketing Association’s approach to prevent enforcement attempts by States of the mandatory use 
tax reporting components of Amazon-styled tax laws for internet transactions.  However, the 
decision did not fully settle the matter. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the 10th Circuit 
for further proceedings on the merits of the claims now that the suit was no longer bared by the 
TIA.63 
 On remand to the 10th Circuit, the court adopted a very different approach in interpreting 
limitations imposed on internet sales-use taxation by the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill.64  The 
Direct Marketing Association argued that Colorado’s Amazon tax variant requiring use tax notice 
and reporting “unconstitutionally discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce”; 
                                                          
54 Tim Landis, State Goes After Unpaid Sales Tax, THE STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Jan. 18th, 2015), http://www.sj-
r.com/article/20150118/NEWS/150119498/0/SEARCH/?Start=1.  
55 Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl, 735 F. 3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 24, 2014) (No. 
13-1032). 
56 Id. 
57 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
58 See generally Brohl, 735 F. 3d at 904. 
59 Id. 
60 Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, 575 U. S. ____ (2015), Question Presented, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-01032qp.pdf. 
61 Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl, 575 U. S. ____ (2015). 
62 Brohl, 575 U. S. ____ (2015) at 5-9 (slip opinion). 
63 Brohl, 135 S. Ct. at 1127, 575 U. S. ____ (2015) [slip opinion page 13]. 
64 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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this argument was very much in alignment with the Quill derived case law on internet sales-use 
tax issues.65  Thus, the overall focus on remand centered on Quill and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause (whether Colorado’s Amazon-styled tax law discriminates against or places an undue 
burden on interstate commerce in an area where Congress has remained silent).66  
  The 10th Circuit determined that Quill “applies narrowly to sales and use tax collection.”67  
Specifically, the court placed emphasis on the concept of collecting taxes as opposed to an 
obligation of reporting that taxes may be owed.  Thus, the court determined that the question of 
whether Colorado’s law had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce depended on the scope 
of Quill.68  Although the Colorado law provided the option for out-of-state retailers to either collect 
and remit sales tax or engage in use tax notice reporting, the court found that this option alone does 
not render Colorado’s law non-discriminatory.69  Ultimately, however, the court determined that 
Quill only extends protection for out-of-state retailers without a physical presence in the state from 
an obligation to collect [emphasis added] sales tax.70   
Since DMA could not provide sufficient evidence that the Colorado use tax notice and 
reporting requirements were more burdensome than what in-state retailers must comply with, the 
court determined the law was non-discriminatory.71  Further, the court found the Colorado law did 
not create an undue burden because it “does not require out-of-state retailers to assess, levy, or 
collect use tax on behalf of Colorado.”72  This last component originated from the case’s earlier 
history when the Tax Injunction Act played a significant role.73  The Supreme Court made it quite 
clear in their ruling prior to remand, that the TIA is linked to tax acts involving assessment, levy, 
or collection, not tax notice and reporting obligations.74As the legal battles over internet sales and 
use tax continued, state governments adopted more interesting and aggressive approaches to assert 
nexus for state tax purposes over e-tailers.   
One such example pertaining to a group of consolidated cases before the Ohio Supreme 
Court in late 2016, involved  a very interesting interpretation of establishing nexus for e-tailers.75 
Rather than emphasizing a sales or use tax in the litigation , Ohio opted for a gross receipts tax (or 
“business privilege tax”) to go after e-tailers without a physical presence such as Newegg.com and 
others.  The case is particularly relevant to other internet sales and use tax cases due to the Quill 
physical presence bright-line test for substantial nexus; ultimately- whether Quill physical 
presence applies equally to a gross receipts tax functioning as a commercial-activity tax in as it 
does to more Amazon-style internet sales and use tax issues for e-tailers. 
In terms of physical presence to satisfy Quill and whether Quill should apply to gross 
receipts taxes in the form of a commercial-activity tax, the Ohio Tax Commissioner creatively 
                                                          
65 Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl, No. 12-1175 at 4 (10th Cir., Feb. 22, 2016). 
66 Id. at 11-12. 
67 Id. at 13. 
68 Id. at 28. 
69 Id. at 28-29. 
70 Id. at 29. 
71 Id. at 31. 
72 Id. at 34. 
73 Supra Brohl, note 56. 
74 Id. at 1131. 
75 See Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 151 Ohio St.3d 278 (Ohio 2016); see also Crutchfield Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 15-
0386 (Ohio filed Mar. 6, 2015); Newegg Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 15-0483 (Ohio filed Mar. 25, 2015); Mason Cos. 
Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 15-0794 (Ohio filed May 19, 2015). 
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argued that the use of software cookies by companies, specifically Crutchfield and Newegg.com, 
but applicable to companies like Amazon.com, Inc., constitutes sufficient physical presence in 
Ohio to establish nexus.76  The basis for this argument originates from the treatment of software 
as tangible property under Ohio state law.77  Such interesting and creative attempts at establishing 
nexus for purposes of internet sales and use tax demonstrate a growing effort by states to increase 
their enforcement and collection efforts.  The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately did not address the 
creative cookies argument when it rendered a decision on the case.78  However, the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that physical presence was not necessary and that the gross receipts tax in the form of 
a commercial activities tax satisfied substantial nexus because it supported a “legitimate interest 
of the state of Ohio” and was imposed “evenhandedly on the sales receipts of in-state and out-of-
state sellers.”79 Thus, Quill physical presence requirements for out-of-state retailers did not apply 
to the Ohio commercial activity tax involving taxable gross receipts of out-of-state etailers, such 
as Newegg. 
 
D. PITFA, MFA, and the RTPA – Legislative Efforts Relevance to Amazon’s 
Strategic Distribution Location Decision-Making 
    
Prior to the Supreme Court’s TIA Brohl decision, the Supreme Court denied Amazon’s 
writ of certiorari for New York’s Amazon internet sales tax law (the progenitor of other States’ 
Amazon tax law variations).80  The ruling placed great reliance on Congress (as the Supreme Court 
both implicitly and explicitly made clear) to enact federal legislation that will comprehensively 
address internet sales and use taxation.  This resulted in a very fractured jurisprudential landscape 
due to differing State supreme court decisions on Amazon-style internet sales and use tax laws and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s passing the buck to Congress set the stage for a drawn out political 
battle.81   
In mid-June 2014, the “Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act” (“PITFA”) successfully 
moved out of the House Judiciary Committee to be considered by the House of Representatives.82  
In July of 2014, the House passed the PITFA and the bill moved to the Senate where it died prior 
to further consideration by the 113th Congress.83   The PITFA bill was specifically designed to act 
as a “[p]ermanent moratorium on Internet access taxes and multiple and discriminatory taxes on 
electronic commerce.”84  Despite failing to become law in 2014, PITFA emerged once again in 
                                                          
76 Crutchfield Inc. v. Testa, Case No. 15-0386 (Ohio filed Mar. 6, 2015), APPELLEE TAX COMMISSIONER’S MERIT 
BRIEF (Oct. 20, 2015) at 43-46, http://supremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=779669.pdf. 
77 Id. at 43-44. 
78 Crutchfield Inc., v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7760 (Nov. 17, 2016) available at 
https://supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2016/2016-ohio-7760.pdf. 
79 Id. at 23-24, ¶ ¶ 55-56. 
80 Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin., cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 682 (2013). 
81 Id. 
82 Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act of 2014, H.R. 3086, 113th Cong. §2 (2d Sess. 2014) [hereinafter “PITFA”]. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at §2. 
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early 2015 and, once again, failed to become law.85  Finally, in February of 2016, PITFA became 
law as a part of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.86 
Although the primary purpose of the PITFA bill is based on preventing states from enacting 
taxes on internet access, the additional language covering “discriminatory taxes on electronic 
commerce” broadly encompasses all types of internet taxation.87  This last component is 
specifically relevant to consideration of internet tax impact on supply chain models.  For example, 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Hamer utilized this additional language to reach their conclusion that 
the ITFA preempted the state of Illinois’ Amazon internet sales tax law.88  Passage of PITFA 
without any additional language specifically related to the Marketplace Fairness Act, and 
consequently internet sales tax issues, could provide for additional arguments against attempts by 
states trying to enforce an Amazon tax style law.89  A state supreme court already used the ITFA 
to preempt a state’s internet sales tax.90  This also possibly explains the previous apprehension of 
proponents of the Marketplace Fairness Act from considering PITFA unless the Marketplace 
Fairness Act was voted on by the House of Representatives first.91 
Unlike PITFA, the Marketplace Fairness Act specifically addresses the internet sales tax 
issues.  The version of the “Marketplace Fairness Act” (the “MFA”) that passed the Senate in 2013 
faced opposition due to perceived deficiencies in how it approaches internet sales and use tax 
collection.92  One of several major concerns regarding the MFA involves the regulatory burden 
associated with granting the various States so much control over remote e-tailers (or “remote 
sellers” as the term is defined in the MFA).93  Several modifications to the MFA aimed at 
addressing these concerns found their way into the version of the billed passed by the Senate. 
Individuals and groups opposed to the MFA, including Texas Senator Ted Cruz, argue that 
for small businesses the consequences of the regulatory compliance burdens imposed by the MFA 
can and will undoubtedly jeopardize small business longevity.94  Yet, for large e-tailers, such as 
Amazon, that have the internal company infrastructure to handle multiple state sales tax 
compliance issues, this would be more of a minor annoyance.  Representative Steve Womack and 
other strong supporters of the MFA point to provisions added to the MFA to accommodate these 
                                                          
85 Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act of 2015, H.R. 235, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); see also Internet Tax 
Freedom Forever Act of 2015, S. 431, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) [a related bill, referred to congressional 
committee on Feb. 10th, 2015, that would permanently extend the Internet Tax Freedom Act]. 
86 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, P.L. 114-125 (02/24/2016) [hereinafter “TFTEA”]. 
87 PITFA, supra note 56, at §2. 
88 Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2013). 
89 See TFTEA, supra note 78. 
90 Hamer, 998 N.E.2d at 59 ¶ 23, supra note 35. 
91 See Eggerton, supra note 40 (referring to Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois, a proponent of the Marketplace Fairness 
Act, specific statements to this effect in December of 2015). 
92 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) [hereinafter “MFA 2013”]. 
93 James R. Sutton, Marketplace Fairness Act: The Fallacy of Simplification and the Private Reporting-Based 
Solution, TAX ANALYSTS (April 23, 2014), 
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/347A2EF66D73C12485257CC2005EAAA5?OpenDocume
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concerns.  Specifically, the small seller exception and the software provision were added to the 
MFA in an attempt to address these concerns.95 
Similar to the MFA, the Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015 (the “RTPA”) would 
permit states to require e-tailers acting as remote sellers to collect sales and use taxes for online 
sales sourced in each state.96  The RTPA contains a three year phase-in for “small remote sellers” 
providing an exception for remote sellers with less than $10 million in annual gross receipts in 
year one and dropping down to an excess of $1 million in gross annual receipts by year three.97  
However, critics of the RTPA point to the irrelevancy of the RTPA small seller exceptions due to 
the language in the second component of the exceptions which effectively cancels out benefits of 
the exceptions for small remote sellers.98  Specifically, the clause of concern states that, regardless 
of gross annual receipts, a state can require collection if the (small or otherwise) remote seller 
“utilizes an electronic marketplace for the purpose of making products or services available for 
sale to the public.”99  Effectively, the federal legislative battle lines over the internet sales and use 
tax debate morphed into bigger versus smaller e-tailer remote sellers. 
Whether from being battle weary over the internet sales tax issue or from arranging ample 
‘sweetheart’ internet sales and use tax exemptions, Amazon is now counted among the supporters 
of the Marketplace Fairness Act legislation.100  Opponents to the MFA, state that when considering 
the impact on small sellers/e-tailers, the Marketplace Fairness Act turns out to be anti-competitive 
through the imposition of a heavy regulatory and compliance burden.  For this reason, companies 
that are heavily involved with small businesses/micro businesses, such as EBay, oppose the 
Marketplace Fairness Act.  To fully evaluate our hypotheses and assess the strategic reasoning 
behind Amazon’s behavior in relation to the impact of internet sales and use tax law changes (and 
Amazon’s 2013 switch in support for the MFA), we use logistics theory and distribution supply 
chain modeling for Amazon derived from key data points. 
 
E. South Carolina’s Online Marketplace Approach and the Multistate Tax Amnesty 
 
 In June 2017, the South Carolina Department of Revenue (the “SCDR”) issued a demand 
to Amazon claiming that Amazon Services, LLC owes approximately $12.5 million due to 
                                                          
95 See MFA 2013, supra note 84, at §2(c)(providing that States can only require remote sellers with gross receipts 
exceeding one million dollars to collect sales and use taxes); see also MFA 2013, supra note 84, at 
§2(b)(2)(D)(specifying that the MFA will provide for free software that will calculate sales and use taxes for remote 
sellers). 
96 Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015, H.R. 2775, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2015) [hereinafter RTPA]. 
97 Id. at §2(c). 
98 John Greathouse, Congress’ Latest Online Tax Grab Will Decimate Small Businesses, FORBES (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngreathouse/2015/07/07/congress-latest-online-tax-grab-will-decimate-small-
businesses/2/#4af9090f5b0e. 
99 RTPA at §2(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
100 Katie McAuliffe, Amazon Can Support the Internet Sales Tax Because Amazon is Exempt, FORBES (Sept. 4, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/09/04/amazon-can-support-the-internet-sales-tax-because-
amazon-is-exempt/#7a6355d3ffb0; see also Amy Martinez, Amazon Stands to Gain from Online-Sales Tax, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 10, 2013), 
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2021142588_amazonsalestaxxml.html (further discussing 
Amazon’s switching of sides from opposing the MFA to supporting it). 
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uncollected taxes.101  Amazon issued a response to both the investing public102 and to the SCDR.103  
The SCDR determined that Amazon bears responsibility for collecting sales taxes on behalf of 
other sellers who use the website based on the SCDR’s interpretation of the broad wording of SC 
§ 12-36-910(A).104  The time frame for South Carolina sales and use taxes allegedly owed by 
Amazon is significant in light of a tax-advantaged supply chain strategy approach by Amazon.  In 
the SCDR’s demand, sales and use taxes allegedly owed by Amazon started accumulating on the 
day of expiration (January 1, 2016)105 of Amazon’s sweetheart sales and use tax deal with South 
Carolina brokered in 2011.106  The South Carolina General Assembly granted the tax deal in 
exchange for Amazon opening a distribution center in Cayce, SC (Lexington County).107  
According to our center of gravity model results, in 2011, not a single location in South Carolina 
was considered an optimal distribution location for Amazon, indicating that the tax deal played a 
role in the location decision.108 
Interestingly, the SCDR emphasized Amazon’s supply chain services (e.g. warehousing 
and distribution) provided to third party sellers as a trigger establishing Amazon as “a person in 
the business of selling tangible personal property at retail”.109  Thus, even if Amazon succeeded in 
optimizing their supply chain for the changing tax landscape under previous versions of the 
Amazon tax, the outcome of the SCDR case could reduce these gains.  Further, since South 
Carolina previously brokered a tax deal with Amazon in exchange for distribution facilities, 
success by the SCDR could also send signals to other States’ governments that feel embittered by 
their tax deals with Amazon. By employing a broader scope of responsibility for collecting online 
sales taxes, a positive outcome for the SCDR of the case hearing may invigorate other States to 
adopt similar approaches to target Amazon.  Contemporaneous with the South Carolina dispute, 
the Multistate Tax Commission (the “MTC”) is offering a tax amnesty to the very same Amazon 
third party sellers whose sales tax obligations associated with Amazon sales the SCDR alleges 
Amazon is responsible for.110 
 
                                                          
101 Eugene Kim, Amazon Faces a Tax Fight in South Carolina That Could Change How Online Sellers Do Business, 
CNBC (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/15/amazon-faces-a-tax-fight-in-south-carolina-that-could-
change-how-online-sellers-do-business.html. 
102 SEC filings, Amazon.com, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (June 30, 2017) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000101872417000100/amzn-20170630x10q.htm. 
103 Request for Contested Case Hearing, Amazon Services, LLC v. South Carolina Dept. of Rev., July 21, 2017, 
available at http://src.bna.com/rI4. 
104 Id.; more specifically, much of the focus was on the following passage from the S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-319: 
“When, however, warehousemen buy and sell property as a regular course of business such sales, if not otherwise 
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105 Id. at 1. 
106 Cassie Cope, Controversial Amazon SC Tax Break Set to Expire in 2016, THE STATE (Dec. 28, 2014), 
http://www.thestate.com/news/local/article13930880.html. 
107 Id.; see also Appendix B. 
108 See Appendix C. 
109 Id. at 4. 
110 Multistate Tax Commission, Online Marketplace Seller Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, Aug. 17, 2017 available 
at http://www.mtc.gov/getattachment/Nexus-Program/Online-Marketplace-Seller-Initiative/Online-Marketplace-
Seller-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-rev12.pdf.aspx (hereinafter “Tax Amnesty”). 
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 The MTC Tax Amnesty allows third party online sellers to apply for voluntary disclosure 
from August 17, 2017 – October 17, 2017 for twenty-three States and District of Columbia.111  
Notably, South Carolina is not [emphasis added] a participant in the amnesty.112 Moreover, when 
comparing the center of gravity model results and tax deal brokering data with the State 
participants in the MTC Tax Amnesty, it is notable that of the 24 State participants, nearly half 
(11) either had Amazon terminate its Associates program in that location or brokered a favorable 
tax deal.  Five of the MTC tax amnesty participants brokered tax deals with Amazon in exchange 
for distribution centers and/or other investment incentives; of these locations, two are efficient 
locations for Amazon’s supply chain distribution system.113  
  Notably, the fact that not all State participants in the amnesty will definitely waive all 
alleged online back tax liabilities makes the amnesty precarious for third party sellers considering 
voluntary disclosure.114 Yet, the fact that a third party seller can “apply to a state for voluntary 
disclosure anonymously and will not be required to disclose its identity to the state” until after an 
agreement is completed may offset this discretionary waiver of back taxes.115 Given this attribute 
of the tax amnesty and a potential shift in the obligations of third party sellers via the pending 
South Carolina Amazon case, it may be best for third party sellers to hedge their bets by applying 
for the amnesty given the anonymity benefits and adopt a wait-and-see approach regarding the 
pending South Carolina Amazon case.  As noted earlier, South Carolina is not participating in the 
MTC tax amnesty, however, if South Carolina wins and is able to hold Amazon responsible for 
third party sellers’ taxes, then other States may follow South Carolina’s lead. 
  
III. Logistics Theory for Warehousing and Implications for the Changing Internet Sales and 
Use Tax Landscape 
  
The logistics component of this article investigates and compares the pattern of distribution 
center site selection processes employed by Amazon across the United States from 1997 to 2017. 
The analysis operates under the assumption of the two hypotheses associated with the changes to 
internet sales and use tax law as a result of the passage of variations of the Amazon tax law.  
Between 1997-2017 Amazon opened a total of 269 distribution centers across the U.S., 
closed eight, and converted one to a seasonal distribution center (Seattle, Washington).116 Figure 1 
displays the growth in non-seasonal U.S. Amazon Distribution Centers starting in 1997 until 2017, 
not inclusive of those centers that may have been closed for various reasons (ex. to avoid nexus 
for tax reasons). As Figure 1 shows, Amazon realized a 52.4% increase in the number of 
distribution centers in the period 2008-2012 as compared to the period 1997-2007 and a 603.1% 
                                                          
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Texas, Tennessee, Massachusetts, Florida, and New Jersey. 
114 Id. (The various footnotes for each State participant in the MTC Tax Amnesty clearly shows an unwillingness to 
commit to a complete waiver of alleged online sales back-tax liabilities for participants.  For example, some States, 
such as Minnesota, are committed to granting at least a shorter lookback period, while others, such as Nebraska, 
simply offer that they “will consider waiving back tax liability”). 
115 Id. at 3. 
116 MWPVL International, Amazon Global Fulfillment Center Network, SUPPLY CHAIN AND LOGISTICS 
CONSULTANTS (March 2015), http://www.mwpvl.com/html/amazon_com.html [hereinafter “Amazon Network”] 
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increase in the number of distribution centers in the period 2013-2017 as compared to the period 
2008-2012117.   
 
Figure 1: Number of New Amazon Fulfillment Distribution Centers118 
 
Interestingly, when we look at the period surrounding 2009, (2009 is a threshold year for 
when States start to implement internet sales-use tax legislation) Amazon closed three distribution 
centers in 2009 in Munster, Indiana,  Red Rock, Nevada, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and 
one later in 2001 in Irving, Texas, after a tax battle with the states, Amazon’s behavior  and pursued 
a strategy that pushed the company into the rural areas of America was based on avoiding the need 
to charge consumers with sales tax (See Appendix A). We can speculate that closing of distribution 
centers in 2009 is related to the internet sales and use tax implications. Amazon began cutting a 
lot of sweetheart internet and sales use tax deals over this time frame.119  The deals delay their 
obligation to comply with the laws, enabling them to strategically get out ahead of the legislation 
and gain tax savings in the process. As 2013 approached, Amazon switched sides, from opposing 
to supporting, the MFA, and opened up 225 new distribution centers between 2013-2017.120  Since 
this competitive advantage is coming to a close, the company has moved its fulfillment centers 
closer to concentrated points of demand to reduce its outbound transportation expense and closed 
facilities that were not located in optimal locations during the tax fight, such as Coffeyville, Kansas 
                                                          
117 Amazon Network, supra note 93. 
118 Note that to run the analysis discussed later in the paper, the locations had to be mutually exclusive in regards to 
city and state.  Therefore, for example, in 2010, Amazon had 2 locations in Phoenix, Arizona, but for analysis 
purposes, only 1 generic location is considered, that is, Phoenix, Arizona; Several resources were used to compile 
the list of Fulfillment centers such as avalara.com, blog.taxjar.com, mwpvl.com, cnn.com, and local news and 
journal outlets for each location. 
119 Investopedia, Sweetheart Deal Definition, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sweetheartdeal.asp. 
120 See McAuliffe, supra note 92. 
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(opened in 1999) and Fernley, Nevada (also opened in 1999) as Amazon realigned its distribution 
network to be closer to larger metropolitan cities.”121  
Locational theory and decision analysis is used to evaluate Amazon’s strategic location 
decisions, that is, to identify where to build the next single fulfillment center, and we compare the 
optimal location to get the product to the customer in relation to internet sales tax legislation.  
Location studies, in general, owe their origins to work in geography and their further development 
in the economics related discipline of regional science and land economics. Fundamental logistics 
books122 discuss how to locate facilities such as factories and warehouses using a common 
approach called the Center of Gravity Method.123  More current and applied work of Holmes 
examined the dispersion of Walmart in the United States through 2005 with a focus on the impacts 
of distribution costs on store locations.124  The time frame assessed by Holmes did not account for 
the internet tax law conflicts associated with e-tailers such as Amazon and affiliates (since Walmart 
has a physical presence and operations in every state).125 As a comparison, by 2005 Amazon had 
twelve distribution centers compared to Walmart with forty-two discount distribution centers and 
thirty-four grocery distribution centers.126  In 2004, Wilson studied location modeling for 
distribution centers and referred to Chicago Consulting, but only focused on locations in 
Australia.127 
A center of gravity model128 is used to examine the associations that exist between 
distribution centers and locations based on the lowest average distance (in miles) to customers and 
the lowest possible transit lead-times to customers, represented by the U.S. population.  Achieving 
lowest possible logistics lead times129 is a key component in an efficient distribution supply chain 
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122 See generally DONALD J. BOWERSOX, LOGISTICAL MANAGEMENT (1974) [discussing contemporary logistical 
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127 David Wilson. Location Modeling in Logistics, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTES 
OF TRANSPORT RESEARCH (CAITR), 36 (2004). 
128 WILSON, supra note 98, at 66. 
129 Lead time is the time (delay) between the initiation of an order and the completion of its fulfillment; see 
generally JAY HEIZER AND BARRY RENDER, OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (2013). 
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strategy due to the fact that strategically located distribution centers facilitate a rapid processing 
of orders and shipments of products to customers.130 
Wilson 131  published the doubly constrained population weighted center of gravity model 
to develop a matrix of city origins and city destination given by:  
 
where Tij represents the freight trips between zone i and j; Oi is the originating freight trips for 
zone i; Dj is the destination freight trips for zone j; Cij represents the “distance” between zone i 
and j; and Ai, Bj are the balancing factors solved iteratively. Finally, α is the friction factor which 
determines the ease of travel between any two zones.  
We partnered with Chicago Consulting132 to simulate the model utilizing their software and 
algorithms to compare optimal strategic DC decisions to Amazon’s actual DC choices (see 
Appendix B).  The software was limited to evaluate 30 distribution centers at any one time. Since 
Amazon operated more than 30 distribution centers after 2011, this limited our quantitative 
analysis to the time period between 1997 (when Amazon opened up their first distribution center) 
and 2011 (after 2011 Amazon operated more than 30 distribution centers). This time period is 
appropriate to aid us in the investigation regarding Amazon’s behavior given the change in the tax 
legislation landscape in 2007-20008 and we evaluate and compare the difference in Amazon’s 
strategic location decisions given the significant change in 1997-2007 compared to the period after 
New York State enacted sales tax legislation, 2008-2011.  After 2011, we provide a qualitative 
analysis discussed later in this paper.  
The urban population (a measure of demand) used in the model is based on 2014 population 
figures, that is, a date after which we compiled the facility distribution data. We find that the 2014 
population data is appropriate and operate under the assumption that the pattern of urban 
population growth is relatively consistent over the time period for our study, alternatively, this 
means that the ratio of population/demand for cities is relatively consistent as well. For example, 
based on the U.S. census that was conducted in 2000, and again in 2010133 (the next time it will be 
conducted is in 2020), New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island is the most populated 
metropolitan area and the population changed by only 3.1% between 2000-2010, Los Angeles-
                                                          
130 PATRIK JONSSON, LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (2008). 
131 WILSON, supra note 98, at 66. 
132 See generally CHICAGO CONSULTING, http://www.chicago-consulting.com/ (last visited May 28, 2016). 
133 See generally UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://www.census.gov/2010census/ (last visited May 28, 2016). 
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Long Beach-Santa Ana remained the second most populated area, and Chicago-Joliet-Naperville 
remained third, etcetera134. 
The results for the optimal location differ depending on the number of distribution centers 
in the network (see Appendix C).  For example, our data and analysis shows that if any one 
organization has only 1 distribution center, then Vincennes, IN would provide the lowest possible 
lead-time; alternatively, if any one organization has only two distribution center, then Ashland, 
KY, and Porterville, CA would provide the lowest possible lead-times.  Therefore, if warehouses 
are not in these optimal locations, this will cause the average transit lead time and the average 
distance to customers to be higher causing less than optimal conditions for shipment of products 
to customers.   
So how does Amazon’s strategic distribution center location decision compare to the best 
possible, or optimal, locations? The results of the model show that Amazon’s network of 
distribution centers would have been better located to serve the U.S. population than where they 
were located (see Appendix C).  From an intuitive perspective, Amazon’s network misses strategic 
locations in crucial regions such as Southern California, Chicago and Atlanta, since these locations 
provide better service and at a lower cost than other (non-optimal) locational choices.135  In 
addition, Amazon’s multiple locations in Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Tennessee overlap each 
other creating a redundancy (see Appendix B) which affects Amazon’s ability to increase the speed 
of delivery of products to areas all across the U.S.  Amazon ramped up activity in California in 
2012 after it negotiated a “sweetheart” deal to delay the tax that was enacted in 2011 until 2012. 
We use metrics to quantitatively evaluate the difference between Amazon’s DC locations 
with the best possible solution (see Table 1). When examining the warehouse decision problem, 
emphasis was placed on minimizing the average distance (in miles) to customers and the average 
lead-time (in days), to provide optimal delivery of products to customers.  We compare each year 
that Amazon opened new distribution centers to the optimal strategic location that would enable 
fastest delivery of products to customers. The change (Δ) in the average distance (in miles) to 
customers between Amazon and the optimal strategic DC location during the period 1997 – 2011 
ranges from an increase of 33%136 to 165%; Alternatively, the change in the average lead time (in 
days) to customers between Amazon and the optimal strategic DC location in ranges from an 
increase of 7% to 31% between 1997 – 2011: 
                                                          
134 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-01, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE 2000 TO 2010 (March 
2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf. 
135 Chicago Consulting, supra note 106. 
136 In 1997, with two distribution centers open, Amazon averaged 674 miles to get products to customers. The 
difference between Amazon’s average (674) and the best possible scenario with two distribution centers (506 
average miles) is 168 average miles.  The ratio 168/506 *100 is the difference (33%) between Amazon’s strategic 
DC locational choices and the optimal DC location choice to get the product to customers as fast as possible, that is, 




Table 1: Comparison of Actual and Best Possible Locations Over Time for Amazon 
 
To test the hypothesis that there was a change in Amazon’s behavior related to the internet tax 
law changes, we examine the time frame that states first enacted sales tax legislation starting with 
New York State’s Amazon Law enacted in 2008137 and several states following suit.  We 
performed a t-test for unequal variances and find that the change in the average lead time (in days) 
for the distribution center locations comparing Amazon’s locations decision to the best possible 
locations is significantly different (two-tail p<.01) for the period 1997-2007 compared to the 
period after New York State enacted sales tax legislation, 2008-2011. Specifically, when 
comparing the difference between the actual (data driven) average distance to customers (in miles) 
to the best possible solution for the periods 1997-2007 and 2008-2011, averages a difference of 
61% and 137%, respectively. The change from 61% in the period 1997-2007 to 137% in the period 
2008-2011 demonstrates empirical evidence that supports Amazon’s decreasing concern to locate 
distribution centers in close proximity to customers. 
The results (Table 1) validate a change in Amazon’s behavior from a focus on optimal 
distribution center location decisions to maximize customer service in their supply chain 
(hypothesis 1) to one aimed to mitigate tax implications through sales tax avoidance by alteration 
of their strategic distribution model (hypothesis 2). For example, in 2008, Amazon had a presence 
in 10 states while the results show that Amazon should have had a presence in 19 different states 
to maximize their proximity to customers. Amazon was minimizing the number of states in which 
they had a presence (they had five distinct distribution centers in various locations in Kentucky 
alone). Additionally, Amazon closed a distribution center in 2011 in a prime location in Texas 
(the Irving, TX distribution center was opened in 2005), in response to the changes in Texas’ tax 
laws. 
                                                          
137 N.Y. State Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi); See Overstock.com, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 20 
N.Y.3d 586, 590, 987 N.E.2d 621, 622 (2013). 
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It should be noted, however, that there is a decrease in the time to get the product to the 
customer, that is, from an average of 1.30 days of transit time for the time period of 1997-2007 to 
an average of 1.15 days of transit time for the time period of 2008-2011. This decrease in transit 
time is merely due to the increased number of distribution centers (refer to Figure 1) but the 
location of the distribution centers is not optimal to best suit a strategy to get the product to the 
consumer in the fastest possible time allotted that would support a strategy that maximizes 
customer service, such as, for example, same day delivery services.   
However, in 2013, Amazon’s strategic distribution center location decisions changed once 
again.  Amazon currently has an enormous distribution network and operates a variety of 
distribution and fulfillment centers in the US including small and large sortable, large non-
sortable, regional sortation centers, Prime Now Hubs, specialty (including cold storage grocery 
(Amazon Pantry and Fresh Distribution Center), apparel and footwear, redistribution, return, 
delivery stations, and 3PL outsourced facilities. The first Amazon Pantry and Fresh Distribution 
center were located in San Bernardino, CA (2013), sortation center in chesterfield, VA (2012), 
delivery station in New York, NY (2014), and Prime Now Hub in New York, NY (2014), 
respectively.   
As of December 2017, Amazon had a presence in 31 states, 25 (or 81%) of which have 
enacted sales tax legislation (see Table 2 on next page)138 including Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 





















                                                          
138 http://www.mwpvl.com/html/amazon_com.html (last accessed 9/27/2016) 
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Table 2: The Total number of Amazon DC's that had been opened 
corresponding to the state enacted tax year* 
 
A. Number of new DC’s that Amazon opened during the year. 
B. Cumulative number of DC’s that Amazon opened to date 
C. Number of New States Amazon entered during the year to establish DC’s  
* Washington facility opened up in 1997 was converted to seasonal facility 2001, and 
Amazon later re-entered Washington with a full-time operating facility in 2007; 
Georgia, McDonough facility opened in 1999 closed in 2001 and Amazon later re-
entered Georgia in 2014; Irving, Texas facility opened in 2005 closed in 2011 and 
Amazon later re-entered Texas in 2013; Munster, Indiana facility opened in 2007 
closed in 2009; Coffeyville, Kansas facility opened in 1999 closed in 2015 and 
Amazon already opened up another DC in Kansas in 2014; Red Rock, Nevada 
facility opened in 1999 closed in 2009 and Amazon later re-entered Nevada in 
2014; Fernley, Nevada facility opened in 1999 closed in 2015; Grand Forks, North 
Dakota facility opened in 1999 closed in 2005 and Amazon later re-entered North 
Dakota in 2014; Chambersburg, Pennsylvania facility opened in 1999 closed in 
2009 and Amazon later re-entered Pennsylvania in 2014 
D.  Cumulative Number of States Amazon entered to establish DC's 
E. Number of States that Amazon has a DC in and have Initiated legislation (the 
percentage of states that Amazon located distribution centers that have initiated 
legislation) 
F. Number of States that Amazon has a DC in and have legislation is taking effect, that is, 
sales tax is being collected (the percentage of states that Amazon located distribution 












 ‘97 ‘99 ‘00 ‘03 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 
A 2 6 1 1 5 1 5 5 
B 2 8 9 8 12 13 18 23 
C 2 5 0 1 1 0 4 0 



































 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17  
A 7 9 11 21 26 64 59 55   
B 27 35 46 67 93 155 214 269  
C 1 2 1 2 6 6 2 2  





































Amazon was careful to steer clear of the five states that had enacted sales tax legislation 
and were starting to collect sales tax through 2012 (58% of states that amazon had DC’s in 
proposed sales tax legislation, while only 17% were collecting sales tax).  In 2012, while 10 states 
had now enacted sales tax legislation, this is however, the first year in which Amazon entered into 
states that enacted sales tax legislation, namely Pennsylvania and California.  Amazon already 
had several facilities located in Pennsylvania years before the legislation took effect in 2012, and 
Amazon entered California the same year that the sales tax legislation took effect in that state, but 
California has been noted by Chicago Consulting, Inc. as being an essential distribution location 
to be able to get the product to the customer. In 2013, Amazon followed entering into Virginia, 
New Jersey, and Texas that had enacted sales tax legislation.  
Amazon’s original strategy based on avoiding the need to charge consumers sales tax and 
reducing costs is undermined by the number of states that have proposed sales tax legislation 
(71%, 76%, 78%, 79%, and 81%) of states at the end of 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, 
respecively139 (see Table 2)).  Since this competitive cost advantage is coming to a close, Amazon 
is focusing on increasing the speed of delivery of packages by strategically positioning its 
distribution centers closer to metropolitan areas (in 2004, 38% of Amazon’s fulfillment capacity 
was less than 200 miles from a major metropolitan area compared to 79% today140), opening up 
smaller sortation centers, purchasing trucks for its own fleet to make deliveries between 
fulfillment centers and sorting locations, and investment in research and development of Prime 
Air, which is a delivery system using small unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) claiming to get 
packages under 5 pounds to customers in 30 minutes or less141. Amazon increased R&D by over 
35% in the last quarter of 2014 compared to the last quarter of 2015, spending over $12 billion in 
R&D during the 2015 calendar year alone142. 
More specifically, Amazon started offering same day delivery services to select locations 
in 2015 and currently offers this service in 16 metro areas in the U.S.143.  As of 2016, Amazon 
offers same-day shipping in metro areas of New York City, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, 
Indianapolis, Tampa Bay, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Dallas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San 
Francisco, Seattle, Chicago, and Orlando.144 In an effort to integrate their distribution and compete 
with major carriers, to allow them to offer same-day service, Amazon is investing in new shipping 
warehouse facilities that are smaller, called “sortation centers”.  There are eight sortation centers 
opened as of 2014 in Kent, WA, Atlanta, GA, Dallas, TX, Houston, TX, Phoenix, AR, Avenel, 
NJ, Hebron, KY, and San Bernardino, CA145. Amazon has announced plans to open 15 specialized 
                                                          
139 Amazon.com, About Sales Tax, AMAZON.COM, INC. (May 28, 2016), 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468512. 
140 Bob Trebilcock. Supply Chain: Amazon is Changing the Rules of the Game, MODERN MATERIALS HANDLING 
(December 14, 2012),  http://www.mmh.com/article/supply_chain_amazon_is_changing_the_rules_of_the_game. 
141 Ahiza Garcia, Amazon Trucks Hit the Road to Speed Deliveries, CNNMONEY (December 4, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/04/news/companies/amazon-delivery-trucks/. 
142 Google Finance, Amazon.com, Inc. Financials, GOOGLE (May 28, 2016), 
https://www.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ%3AAMZN&fstype=ii&ei=6zXZU5j6KMqfrAHHp4GoCA. 
143 Amazon.com, Free-Same Day Delivery, AMAZON.COM, INC. (May 28, 2016), 
http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8729023011. 
144 Id. 




sortation centers this year alone, designed to be speedier and expand deliveries to Sundays, which 
gets packages to nearby USPS offices for last-mile service.  
    
IV. Conclusion 
 
The data compiled matching up Amazon’s reaction to alternations in sales and use tax 
legislation and policies following the enactment of the New York Amazon tax law show a 
transition from Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 2.  This really begins to manifest around 2008 
demonstrating a significant reactionary shift in Amazon’s supply chain strategy from speed of 
delivery to deterring costs associated with new state Amazon ‘internet’ sales and use tax laws and 
policies.146  Evaluating the data, it is clear that efficiency in their supply chain diminished in 
response to the growth of various Amazon-style internet sales tax legislation.  However, after 
Amazon concluded an acceptable number of tax sweetheart deals, by 2013 there is a shift back to 
Hypothesis 1.  Thus, internet sales and use tax legislation’s influence over Amazon’s strategic 
supply chain decision-making was effectively nullified at this point.  Consequently, Amazon 
started supporting federal legislation they previously opposed on the internet sales and use tax 
issue around 2013. 
While much of the opposition to the Marketplace Fairness Act focused on how the MFA 
harms small e-tailers, the compilation of Amazon’s DC/warehousing and internet sales and use tax 
legislative data in our model resulted in an outcome demonstrating the negative consequences to 
large e-tailers, such as Amazon.  This adds a new layer to the internet sales and use tax discussion 
which previously focused on small sellers and marketing affiliate impacts.  Thus, the current 
patchwork of state internet sales and use tax laws undermine e-tailer operational effectiveness and 
diminish consumer value by negatively impacting supply chain efficiency for large e-tailers in 
addition to potentially harming small sellers and marketing affiliates. This is in addition to 
concerns voiced by numerous researchers and commentators regarding the impact of legislation 
such as the MFA on small and micro e-tailers.  
Today, Amazon has more than 70 domestic fulfillment centers in 30 states.147   Amazon is 
investing to provide faster service to its customers by building DC’s near major metropolitan areas. 
Amazon is making deals with states where it plans to open up distribution centers in optimal 
locations (see Appendix A), and showing support of the MFA.148 It can be argued that, the increase 
in the number of states that have implemented the “Amazon sales tax” laws, and Amazon’s 
subsequent support of the Marketplace Fairness Act, allowed Amazon to focus on same-day 
deliveries; this is represented by the shift from Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 2 and back to 




                                                          
146 Another potential factor encouraging state revenue agencies to push for more revenue could be associated with 
the timing since this was in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis. 
147 Amazon Network, supra note 93. 
















Amazon.com, Inc.’s Reaction 
 
2008 2008 NY Went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court 
2009 2014 NC Amazon ended affiliates program; legal problems delayed 
tax collection; Amazon began collecting on Feb. 1, 2014 
2009 2009 RI Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon began 
“voluntarily collecting” on Feb. 1, 2017. 
2009 N/A HI Amazon threatened to end affiliates program; Governor 
vetoed tax; Amazon collecting w/national program April 1, 
2017 
2010 N/A CO Amazon ended affiliates program; Law tied up in courts by 
Direct Marketing Association (trade association); Amazon 
began collecting Feb. 1, 2016. 




OK Use tax notification law requiring out-of-state internet 
retailers to provide notification of use tax requirements; 
final Amazon style law adopted in 2017; Amazon began 
collecting March 1, 2017. 
2011 2011 VT Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon began collecting 
on Feb. 1, 2017 (VT modified Amazon law went into effect 
July 2017….so Amazon complied several months early). 
2011 2011 
 
AR Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon finally began 
collecting in Arkansas on April 1, 2017 along with 
remaining others as part of NATIONWIDE announcement 
to collect. 





SD Use tax notification law requiring out-of-state internet 
retailers to provide notification of use tax requirements 
[Similar to OK’s Amazon law]; Amazon began collecting 
on Feb, 1, 2017. 
2011 2016 LA Amazon Tax Legislative Proposals failed until 2016; 
Amazon began collecting Jan. 1, 2017. 
2011 2015 IL Illinois Supreme Court vetoed law – cited Internet Tax 
Freedom Act [ITFA] in 2011. Amended law passed in 2015 
and Amazon begins collection then. Facilities in IL in 2017? 
2011 N/A ID Proposal failed; Began collecting with nationwide 
announcement on April 1, 2017. 
2011 2012 CA Amazon threatened to end affiliates program. CA made a 
deal to delay tax. Amazon reinstated affiliates program and 
collected starting in 2012. 
2012 2012 PA Amazon refused to comply for 8 months (Feb. [when law 
initiated] – Sept. 2012 (Amazon started to collect) 
2012 2013 GA Amazon required to start collection in September 2013 
2012 2013 AZ Not a specific Amazon law, but brokered deal due to 
Amazon warehouses in AZ- Amazon began collecting State 
level AZ tax on Feb. 1, 2013 
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2012 2012 TX TX stated that current sales tax law already applied to 
Amazon and sent a bill ($269m) to Amazon to collect back 
taxes.  Amazon closed Irving distribution center.; Amazon 
brokered deal in April 2012 for new distribution centers and 
began collecting in July 2012. 
2012 2013 MA Amazon makes a deal to open distribution centers (incl. jobs 
& investment in the state) to delay tax collection until 2013 
(law based around Amazon deal); Collects on Nov. 1, 2013 
2013 2013 MO Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon began collecting 
on Feb. 1, 2017. 
2013 2013 MN Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon started 
collecting voluntarily on Oct. 1, 2014; Distribution plans. 
2013 2015 OH Governor vetoed the law in 2013 but cut a deal with 
Amazon to start collection in 2015 in exchange for web 
services data centers. 
2013 2014 MD Announced in 2013; Amazon began collecting on Oct. 1, 
2014 due to Southeast Baltimore Distribution Center. 
2013 2013 IA Law passed/no reaction due to no physical 
presence/affiliates issues; Amazon began collecting 
voluntarily on Jan. 1, 2017 perhaps in anticipation of 2017 
National Collection. 
2011 2013 CT Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon began collecting 
on Nov. 1, 2013 in agreement to invest in CT. 
2012 2013 NJ Amazon cut a deal in 2012 to delay tax by fifteen months, as 
well as other financial incentives, in an agreement to build 
distribution centers in the state. Began collecting on July 1, 
2013. 
2013 2013 VA Amazon makes capital investment in the state and begins 
collecting on Sept. 1, 2013. 
2013 2013 WI Amazon began collecting on Nov. 1, 2013; Opened Kenosha 
DC in 2015. 
2013 2015 MI Amazon began collecting on Oct. 1, 2015. 
2013 2013 WV Amazon initially ended affiliates program, but then 
complied/began collecting in October 2013. 
2013 2013 ME Amazon ended affiliates program; Amazon began collecting 
as part of nationwide collection on April 1, 2017. 
2011 N/A MS Law failed in legislature; Amazon began collecting on Feb. 
1, 2017. 
2012 2014 IN Amazon made a deal with Gov. Mitch Daniels to start 
collecting sales tax in January 2014. 
2014 2014 FL In 2013 Amazon makes a deal to open distribution centers 
(inc. jobs & investment in the state) to delay tax collection 
until May 2014 (law based around Amazon deal) 
2012 2014 NV In 2012 Amazon makes a deal to open distribution centers 
(inc. jobs & investment in the state) to delay tax collection 
until January 2014 (law based around Amazon deal) 
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2012 2014 TN In 2012 Amazon made a deal to delay sales tax collection 
until January 2014 
2011 2016 SC In 2011 Amazon makes a deal to open distribution centers 
(inc. jobs & investment in the state) to delay tax collection 
until January 2016 (law based around Amazon deal) 
2015 2016 AL Alabama implemented a law in 2015; Amazon started 
collecting on Nov. 1, 2016. 
2017 2017 NE Amazon started collecting in Nebraska on Jan 1, 2017 
(anticipation of Nationwide collection efforts). 
2017 2017 NM Amazon started collecting in New Mexico on April 1, 2017 
as part of NATIONWIDE collection. 
2017 2017 UT Amazon started collecting in Nebraska on Jan 1, 2017 
(anticipation of Nationwide collection efforts). 
2017 2017 WY Amazon started collecting in Nebraska on March 1, 2017 





















































Delaware New Castle 1997  -- -- 
Washington Seattle 1997 2001 -- 
Georgia McDonough 1999 2001 -- 
Kansas Coffeyville 1999 2015 -- 
Kentucky Campbellsville 1999 -- -- 
Nevada Fernley 1999 2015 2014 
Nevada Red Rock 1999 2009 2014 
North Dakota Grand Forks 1999 2005 -- 
Kentucky Lexington (1) 2000 -- -- 
Pennsylvania Chambersburg 2003 2009 2012 
Kentucky Hebron (1) 2005 -- -- 
Kentucky Hebron (2) 2005 -- -- 
Kentucky Louisville 2005 -- -- 
Kentucky Shepherdsville (1) 2005 -- -- 
Kentucky Shepherdsville (3) 2005 -- -- 
Texas Irving 2005 2011 2012 
Kentucky Lexington (2) 2006 -- -- 
Arizona Phoenix (1) 2007  -- -- 
Indiana Munster 2007 2009 -- 
Kentucky Hebron (3) 2007 -- -- 
New Hampshire Nashua 2007 -- -- 
Washington Bellevue 2007 -- -- 
Arizona GoodYear 2008  -- -- 
Indiana Plainfield (1) 2008  -- -- 
Indiana Whitestown 2008  -- -- 
Nevada Las Vegas 2008 -- 2014 
Pennsylvania Hazleton 2008 -- 2012 
Arizona Phoenix (2) 2010  -- -- 
Pennsylvania Breinigsville (1) 2010 -- 2012 
Pennsylvania Carlisle (1) 2010 -- 2012 
Pennsylvania Carlisle (2) 2010 -- 2012 
Pennsylvania Lewisberry 2010 -- 2012 
Virginia Sterling 2010 -- 2013 
Arizona Phoenix (3) 2011  -- -- 
Indiana Indianapolis 2011 -- -- 
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Indiana Plainfield (2) 2011 -- -- 
Kentucky Shepherdsville (2) 2011 -- -- 
Pennsylvania Breinigsville (2) 2011 -- 2012 
South Carolina Cayce 2011 -- 2016 
Tennessee Charleston 2011 -- 2014 
Tennessee Chattanooga 2011 -- 2014 
Tennessee Lebanon (1) 2011 -- 2014 
Washington Sumner 2011 -- -- 
Delaware Middletown 2012 --  -- 
Indiana Jefferson 2012 -- -- 
South Carolina Spartanburg 2012 -- 2016 
Tennessee Murfreesboro 2012 -- 2014 
Virginia Chesterfield 2012 -- 2013 
Virginia Petersburg 2012 -- 2013 
California San Bernardino (1) 2012 -- 2012 
California San Bernardino* (2) 2013 -- 2012 
California Patterson 2013  -- 2012 
California Stockton1 2013 -- 2012 
California5 Tracy 2013  -- 2012 
Kentucky Shepherdsville 2013 -- -- 
New Jersey Avenel* 2013 -- 2013 
New Jersey Avenel4 2013 -- 2013 
Pennsylvania Carlisle 2013 -- 2012 
Tennessee Lebanon (2) 2013 -- 2014 
Texas Coppell 2013 -- 2012 
Texas Haslet 2013 -- 2012 
Texas Schertz 2013 -- 2012 
Washington DuPont 2013 -- -- 
After 2013, this list only includes facilities if it was the first time Amazon had 
established a presence in that state (or reestablished after the closing of facilities 
earlier established)  
Florida Davenport* 2014 -- 2014 
Georgia Atlanta* 2014 -- 2013 
Kansas Lenexa* 2014 -- -- 
Maryland Baltimore* 2014 -- 2014 
Massachusetts Stoughton* 2014 -- 2013 
New York New York2 2014 -- 2008 
North Carolina Concord* 2014 -- 2014 
Wisconsin Kenosha* 2014 -- 2013 
Connecticut Windsor 2015 -- 2013 
Illinois Chicago2 2015 -- 2015 
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Michigan Trenton* 2015 -- 2015 
Minnesota Shakopee* 2015 -- 2013 
Oregon Portland3 2015 -- -- 
Colorado Aurora* 2016 -- N/A 
Ohio Cincinnati3 2016 -- 2015 
 *sortation center 
1 large non-sortable items fulfillment center outsourced to 3PL Menlo Logistics 
2 Delivery Station 
3 Prime Now Hub 
4 Pantry and Fresh Distribution Center 
5 Additionally, in 2013 Amazon opened up nine more facilities in California (one was an Amazon Pantry 











































Appendix C: Center of Gravity Model Results 
YEAR Actual Locations 
Best Possible Locations with same number of 
locations 
1997 New Castle DE Seattle WA   Ashland KY  Porterville CA    
1999 New Castle DE Campbellsville 
KY 
Grand Forks ND Brooklyn NY  Chicago IL  Bell Gardens CA  
  Seattle WA Fernley NV Red Rock NV Athens GA  Palestine TX  Bonney Lake 
WA 
  Coffeyville KS McDonough GA   Palm Bay FL Aurora CO    
2000 New Castle DE Campbellsville 
KY 
Grand Forks ND Brooklyn NY  Chicago IL  Bell Gardens CA  
  Seattle WA Fernley NV Red Rock NV Aiken SC  Palestine TX  Bonney Lake 
WA 
  Coffeyville KS McDonough GA Lexington  KY Lakeland FL Denver CO San Juan PR  




  Coffeyville KS Grand Forks ND   Chicago IL Grand Prairie 
TX 
  
  Campbellsville 
KY 
Red Rock NV   Palm Bay FL Athens GA   
2003 New Castle DE Fernley NV Lexington  KY Brooklyn NY  Chicago IL  Bell Gardens CA  
  Coffeyville KS Grand Forks ND Chambersburg 
PA 
Athens GA  Palestine TX  Bonney Lake 
WA 
  Campbellsville 
KY 
Red Rock NV   Palm Bay FL Aurora CO   
2005 New Castle DE Fernley NV Chambersburg 
PA 
Astoria, NY  Pasadena, CA Athens, GA 
  Coffeyville KS Red Rock NV Irving Texas  Rockford, IL Palestine, TX Bonney Lake 
WA 
  Campbellsville 
KY 
Lexington  KY Hebron  KY Oakland CA  Marion OH Lakeland FL 
  Louisville KY Shepherdsville  
KY 
   San Juan PR Aurora, CO   
2007 New Castle DE Red Rock NV Louisville KY Passaic NJ Pasadena, CA Buford GA 








  Campbellsville 
KY 
Irving Texas Lexington  KY Oakland CA Mansfield OH Lakeland FL 
  Fernley NV Hebron  KY Phoenix  AZ San Juan PR Lakeville MN Boulder CO 
  Nashua NH Bellevue WA Munster IN Harrisonville 
MO 
Waipahu HI Springfield MO 
2008 New Castle DE Lexington  KY Shepherdsville  
KY 
Astoria NY Glendale CA Atlanta GA 
  Coffeyville KS Chambersburg 
PA 
Phoenix  AZ Cicero IL Waco TX Bonney Lake 
WA 
  Campbellsville 
KY 
Irving Texas Nashua NH Lakeland FL Boulder CO San Juan PR 
  Fernley NV Hebron  KY Bellevue WA Oakland CA Lakewood OH Waipahu HI 
  Red Rock NV Louisville KY Munster IN Alexandria VA Harrisonville 
MO 
Anoka MN 
  GoodYear AZ Whitestown IN Hazleton PA Phoenix AZ Jackson MS Rock Hill SC 
  Plainfield  IN Las Vegas NV   Peabody MA Houlton ME   
2009 New Castle DE Hebron  KY GoodYear AZ Passaic NJ Glendale CA  Athens, GA 
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Whitestown IN Oakland CA Mansfield OH Lakeland FL 
  Fernley NV Phoenix  AZ Las Vegas NV San Juan PR Lakeville MN Boulder CO 
  Lexington  KY Nashua NH Hazleton PA Phoenix AZ Waipahu HI Gaithersburg 
MD 
  Irving Texas Bellevue WA   Waco TX Hattiesburg 
MS 
  
2010 New Castle DE Louisville KY Plainfield  IN Astoria NY Glendale CA Atlanta GA 
  Coffeyville KS Shepherdsville  
KY 
Whitestown IN Cicero IL Waco TX Bonney Lake 
WA 
  Campbellsville 
KY 
Phoenix  AZ Las Vegas NV Lakeland FL Aurora CO San Juan PR 
  Fernley NV Nashua NH Hazleton PA Oakland CA Lakewood OH Waipahu HI 
  Lexington  KY Bellevue WA Breinigsville  PA Alexandria VA Harrisonville 
MO 
Anoka MN 
  Irving Texas GoodYear AZ Carlisle  PA Phoenix AZ Jackson MS Rock Hill SC 
  Hebron  KY Lewisberry PA Sterling VA Peabody MA Lawrenceburg
, IN 
Clearfield UT 
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